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Abstract 
This study examines Sri Lanka’s conflict history and interfaith dialogue (IFD), situated with regard 
to the devastating 2019 Easter bombings. Religious identity has become more conspicuous in Sri 
Lankan society, as demonstrated in more religious extremism and interfaith activities, including 
among actors and groups who traditionally avoided such initiatives. Based on narrative analysis of 
interviews with representatives from the country’s four major religions discussing interfaith 
activities, communal relations and Buddhist extremism, this paper highlights how legacies from the 
war have exacerbated long-lasting divisions and mistrust between the country’s ethno-religious 
groups, even if they were not the original conflict actors.  
Following ethno-religious conflict, local-level interfaith activities have limited impact as they do 
not reach extremists and generally engage people already committed to non-violent social change. 
Since the civil war termination in 2009, faith groups and civil society have expressed reservations 
about inter-communal relations and the potential for further violence. These fears were realised with 
the devastating Jihadi bombings in Easter 2019. 
Key words: Sri Lanka, terrorism, interfaith, post-conflict, Muslims, extremism  
Resumen  
Este estudio examina la historia de los conflictos y el diálogo interreligioso en Sri Lanka, en 
relación con los devastadores bombardeos de Pascua de 2019. La identidad religiosa se ha vuelto 
más notoria en la sociedad de Sri Lanka, como se demuestra en la presencia de un mayor 
extremismo religioso y actividades interreligiosas, incluso entre actores y grupos que 
tradicionalmente evitaban tales iniciativas. Basado en el análisis narrativo de entrevistas con 
representantes de las cuatro religiones principales del país que discuten actividades interreligiosas, 
relaciones comunales y extremismo Budista, este documento destaca cómo los legados de la guerra 
han exacerbado las divisiones duraderas y la desconfianza entre los grupos etnoreligiosos del país, 
incluso si no fueron los actores originales del conflicto. 
Después del conflicto etnoreligioso, las actividades interreligiosas a nivel local tienen un impacto 
limitado ya que no llegan a los extremistas y generalmente involucran a personas que ya están 
comprometidas con el cambio social no violento. Desde el final de la guerra civil en 2009, los 
grupos religiosos y la sociedad civil han expresado sus reservas sobre las relaciones 
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intercomunitarias y el potencial para una mayor violencia. Estos temores se hicieron realidad con 
los devastadores bombardeos yihadistas en la Pascua de 2019.   
Palabras clave: Sri Lanka, terrorismo, interreligioso, posconflicto, musulmanes, extremismo 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the relationships 
between ethno-religious relations and violence, 
and interfaith activities, in the context of post-
civil war Sri Lanka. This study illustrates the 
phenomenon that targets of violence are not 
necessarily the original conflict actors or 
representatives of a perpetrator group. To 
situate the data for this paper, the respondents 
were interviewed in 2014 following a series of 
ethnic riots that mostly targetted Muslims. The 
interviewees argued that violence had become 
‘normalised’ as a problem-solving mechanism 
in Sri Lankan polity and the country’s ethno-
religious relations had been severely damaged 
as a result of the civil war legacies, even 
though the main perpetrators and victims of 
post-2009 violent riots were not the original 
wartime actors or their proxies. The 
respondents discussed the likelihood of further 
group violence, and suggested that it would 
probably be based on religious rather than 
ethnic divisions. 
There are some perplexing elements 
surrounding the 2019 bombings. Sri Lanka has 
a recent history of Buddhism extremism, so 
why were the bombings primarily attacking 
Christians and churches? Given how much 
Muslims suffered in the war from the LTTE 
(Tamil Tigers), why did the bombers not 
specifically target Tamils? To what extent do 
the bombers represent the grievances of Sri 
Lankan Muslims more generally? 
The rise of domestic anti-Muslim 
discourse and mob violence is however an 
insufficient cause of the 2019 bombings. There 
is also the factor of the divided and inefficient 
governance and security apparatus of the Sri 
Lankan state, which was unable or unwilling to 
heed warnings from different sources that a 
terrorist attack was imminent. Political 
infighting and lack of information-sharing at 
elite levels highlights the necessity for 
coordination and transparency when dealing 
with terrorist threats, and the risks of erratic 
implementation of security policies.  
This article proceeds as follows: I 
provide an overview of the Easter 2019 events 
and security failures, and then a literature 
review that examines Islam in Sri Lanka, 
interfaith work, terrorism incidence, and post-
war legacies. There is a section on research 
methodology, timing, and the iterative nature 
of interview data. Following this, the bulk of 
the article engages with the interviews to focus 
on religious identities and extremism in 
modern Sri Lanka, and then the impacts and 
limitations of interfaith peacebuilding efforts. 
The conclusion draws together the contested 
positionality of ethno-religious groups in a 
pluralistic society, and civil war impacts, in 
how these influence the conditions for further 
mass violence. This paper suggests that the 
Easter 2019 bombings expose the limitations of 
interfaith activities, but more saliently, the 
relevance of both direct causal factors of 
terrorist violence and the conditions in which it 
occurs. The conditions in this case relate most 
strongly to post-war tensions and divisions, 
normalisation of violence, and shortcomings of 
interfaith efforts among other aspects of 
peacebuilding activities. Although the scale 
and type of violence perpetrated by extremists 
from Buddhism and Islam may differ, they 
have much in common in terms of worldview, 
claims to victimhood and scapegoating of ‘the 
other’.  
2. The 2019 Easter bombings in 
context 
For the future, ethnic conflict will not 
be the main conflict, it will be religious. 
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(Sri Lankan Catholic Priest speaking in 
2014)  1
Following the cessation of the civil war in 
2009, Sri Lanka has witnessed multiple attacks 
linked to Buddhist extremist organisations such 
as the Bodu Bala Sena  (BBS) and others, 2
targeting Muslims and to a lesser extent 
Christians. Multiple ethnic riots have featured 
street killings by mobs, and destruction of 
property, businesses and houses of worship. 
Post-war tensions and armed violence are 
associated more with anti-Muslim sentiment 
than anti-Tamil, despite the dynamics of the 
main conflict actors during the civil war. Sri 
Lanka has a long history of ethnic riots and 
massacres (Imtiyaz & Stavis 2008), but the 
most destructive post-war riots have occurred 
in 2014 and 2018. Incidents of terrorism or 
mass atrocities carried out by Islamic 
extremists were notable by their absence. 
However, that changed drastically on 21 
April 2019. During Easter services, a well-
coordinated series of Jihadi bombings targeted 
churches, hotels and subsequently homes in 
and around the capital Colombo and the town 
of Batticaloa on the East coast. Of the 259 
people killed, 45 were foreigners, and over 500 
people were injured (Asia Times 2019). The 
Easter 2019 events deeply shocked a populace 
already traumatised and divided by decades of 
open violence. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), the violent separatist 
organisation that fought the Sri Lankan state 
from 1983 to 2009 during the civil war, was 
infamous for multiple suicide attacks on soft 
targets such as civilians, schools and 
businesses, but the 2019 bombing was the first 
large-scale terrorist attack since the end of the 
war 10 years previously.  
On 23 April 2019, the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS, 
claimed it had carried out the bombings (New 
York Times 2019). However, the Sri Lankan 
government claimed all the nine suicide 
bombers were Sri Lankan nationals from an 
Islamist organisation named National 
Thowheeth Jama'ath (NTJ), which had not 
previously attracted much attention from 
domestic security forces, although it had 
pledged allegiance to ISIL and was influenced 
by its philosophies (Aljazeera 2019). The NTJ 
was only banned on 27 April 2019, a week 
after the bombings, and its assets were seized 
by Sri Lankan security forces. On 23 April, 
S t a t e M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e R u w a n 
Wijewardene, stated that the government 
considered the bombings to be in retaliation for 
the anti-Muslim massacre in March 2019 in 
Christchurch, New Zealand. However, this 
connection was disputed, most prominently by 
the New Zealand government (Reuters 2019), 
given that the Easter bombings must have been 
planned long before the Christchurch massacre 
and there was no concrete evidence that the 
events were connected. 
In the immediate aftermath of the 
bombings, the Sri Lankan government blocked 
access to all social media networks and 
messaging services, allegedly to reduce the 
spread of misinformation or calls for 
retaliation, but this also had the effect of 
preventing people ascertaining the status or 
whereabouts of family members. Five days 
later on 26 April, the Sri Lankan Army and the 
Special Task Force, a para-military unit of the 
Police that specialises in counter-terrorism, 
c a r r i e d o u t a s e a r c h o p e r a t i o n i n 
Sainthamaruthu, a town on the eastern coast. 
There, three explosions and a shootout 
 Interview 12, Catholic Priest1
	Normally translated in English as ‘Buddhist Power Force’2
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occurred when the security forces raided a 
Jihadi base. Three suicide bombers detonated 
themselves, killing nine family members, six of 
them children, and three other Islamic militants 
were shot dead by security forces. 
Following the bombings, contentious 
evidence emerged of severe operational and 
tactical weaknesses within Sri Lanka’s security 
forces and Police, and they faced criticism for 
their intelligence failures. The government 
admitted it was responsible for a “major 
intelligence lapse” (BBC 2019). According to 
the leader of parliament, Lakshman Kiriella 
among others, Indian security forces had 
shared inte l l igence with Sr i Lankan 
counterparts about potential terrorist attacks, 
for example on 4 April and 11 April 2019. 
These intelligence reports included specific 
data such as probable locations and targets, 
likely churches. Unfortunately, none of this 
intelligence was shared among senior decision-
makers in Sri Lanka and no preventative action 
was taken by security forces. The prime 
minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, and his 
cabinet had not received any warnings about 
planned Jihadi attacks, as due to political 
infighting, they had been excluded from 
national security council meetings, led by 
President Sirisena. Similarly, Rajitha 
Senaratne, Sri Lanka’s health minister, 
admitted on 22 April that the Sri Lankan 
authorities were warned two weeks before the 
terrorist attacks, and even divulged that some 
of the suspects had been named by the chief of 
national intelligence on 9 April (Guardian 
2019). 
There were calls for senior figures to 
resign, like Defence Secretary Hemasiri 
Fernando and particularly the Inspector 
General of Police, Pujith Jayasundara. Much of 
the deliberate lack of information sharing was 
due to the political rivalries between President 
Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, 
and their supporting factions. For example, 
Sirisena had unsuccessfully tried to remove 
Wickremesinghe from office in October 2018, 
and following that, the Sri Lankan government 
was effectively split into two parallel 
administrations whose staff and offices had 
little communication with each other. 
Wickremesinghe attempted to hold a security 
council meeting on the Sunday morning 
following the 2019 bombings with the main 
security forces, but none were willing to attend 
the meeting without Sirisena’s approval, who 
was abroad at the time (Guardian 2019). The 
previous President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, 
criticised the Sirisena administration and 
accused it of systematically undermining Sri 
Lanka’s intelligence apparatus. Rajapakse even 
c l a i m e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t b e a r s f u l l 
responsibility for the 2019 attacks, due to its 
failures to act on concrete intelligence or share 
vital information (Daily Mirror 2019a). 
The Sri Lankan government is however 
to be commended for its handling of immediate 
post-bombings tensions, as they avoided any 
mass retaliation killings. A small number of 
violent revenge attacks occurred, but these 
were isolated and seemingly not coordinated. 
The main immediate responses were an 
outpouring of shock and grief at a national 
level. In a positive development, the post-
bombing po l i t i c a l env i ronmen t was 
characterised by calls for peace from senior 
government leaders, and there were only a few 
and isolated revenge attacks against Muslims, 
nothing on the scale of previous ethnic riots. 
This could be an indication of how much 
influence the government retains regarding the 
potential for fomenting ethno-religious 
violence. The religious aspects of the Easter 
2019 bombings are evident, as Islamic 
extremists attacked Christian places of worship 
and upmarke t ho te l s as symbols of 
international power and globalisation.  
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For a country with as much experience of 
terrorist violence as Sri Lanka, the NTJ had 
previously attracted a curiously low level of 
interest from the security forces. Several Sri 
Lankan Muslim organisations had denounced 
the NTJ and its leader Zahran Hashim for 
i n d o c t r i n a t i n g y o u t h i n t o J i h a d i 
fundamentalism, posting radical Islamic 
sermons on YouTube, fighting with monks and 
attacking Buddhist statues and temples (CNN 
2019). Members of NTJ had been actively 
persecuting other Muslims, for example Sufis, 
in towns such as Kattankudy in the East for 
years prior to the bombings (CNN 2019). 
Following an incendiary YouTube posting by 
Zahran Hashim that promoted violent Jihad, 
the Chairman of a large mosque in Colombo 
denounced him to the authorities as a threat, as 
did the Vice President of the Muslim Council 
of Sri Lanka. However, the security forces took 
no action. President Sirisena only outlawed the 
NTJ on 27 April 2019, after the suicide 
bombings (in which Zahran Hashim died). In a 
further indication that the NTJ had enemies 
within the Islamic community, a mosque used 
by the NTJ in Kekirawa was physically 
destroyed by local Muslims in May 2019 
(Daily Mirror 2019b). 
3. Literature Review 
To con tex tua l i se the soc io -po l i t i ca l 
environment in which the 2019 bombings 
occurred, previous studies under four 
interconnected topics are relevant. These are 
the social position of Sri Lankan Islam, the 
impact of faith-based peacebuilding efforts, 
factors influencing the incidence of terrorism, 
and legacies of civil war. Each of these 
influences the socio-political environment, 
coupled with the shortcomings of state security 
apparatus described previously.  
3.1. The contested positionality of 
Islam in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka has a highly complex religious 
environment, with a Buddhist majority and 
significant Christian, Hindu and Muslim 
populations; however, there is no exact 
correspondence between religious and ethnic 
identities. Most of the extant scholarly 
literature approaches the post-war social 
environment from the binary perspective that 
the ethnic groups of Sinhalese and Tamils were 
the primary conflict actors. The polarising 
impacts of the war had ramifications on the 
positioning of all social groups in the country; 
the identities of Muslims, during the war but 
also more generally, have not received 
sufficient attention by scholars or politicians 
(Haniffa 2007; McGilvray & Raheem 2007; 
Haniffa 2009). This lack of scholarly attention 
is likely a legacy of the conflict, as “the civil 
war masked long-standing anti-Muslim 
sentiment” (DeVotta & Ganguly 2019:141) and 
“attacks on Muslim minorities are an extension 
of pre-existing oppression patterns faced by 
other minorities” (Stewart 2014:241). Sri 
Lanka’s Muslims are more likely to be 
identified by their religion than their ethnicity, 
as compared to other ethno-religious groups in 
the country (Klem 2011). Much anti-Muslim 
rhetoric in recent years has focussed on issues 
of halal foods, forced marriage and religious 
conversions, high birth rates, and Islamic 
violations of Buddhist sanctity (Stewart 2014; 
Sarjoon et al 2016). There has been a 
disconcerting rise in hate-speech and anti-
Muslim propaganda (Aliff 2015) positioning 
Islam as inimical to Sri Lanka’s national and 
cultural integrity. 
The war marginalised multiple aspects of 
Muslim displacement and victimisation, and 
their suffering in the conflict and their social 
position thereafter have not been sufficiently 
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acknowledged (Uyangoda 2007). The complex 
relationship between Islam and politics has 
generally suffered from a lack of integration 
with other scholarly works on Sri Lanka, which 
goes some way to explaining the divisions in 
the Muslim community, including their 
weakness to collectively confront enemies 
(Klem 2011): Buddhist extremists, political 
propaganda, or LTTE atrocities. Some 
observers had postulated that any Islamic 
fundamentalism that emerged would be a 
reaction to the oppression and forced relocation 
of Muslims by the LTTE during the war years 
(Deegalle 2006), yet the 2019 bombings did 
not target Tamils or LTTE proxies, except 
inasmuch that some Tamils are Christians. 
McGilvray explores how the country’s 
Muslims are in a difficult and divisive social 
position, caught between the “ethno-nationalist 
rivalries” (2011:45) of Sinhalese and Tamils on 
one hand, and doctrinal tensions in competing 
Islamic ideologies at the international levels. 
Recent years have seen a raised awareness of 
S r i Lanka ’s Mus l ims r ega rd ing the 
positionality of Islam globally, and also 
tensions within Muslim communities about 
Sufism and more fundamentalist ideologies 
such as Wahhabism. Despite this, Sri Lanka’s 
Muslim communities have not produced any 
specific indigenous Islamic reformist 
movements (McGilvray 2011). Various 
tensions and complexities thus exist within 
Muslim communities and specifically 
regarding their identities in a pluralistic 
country like Sri Lanka, yet they are treated as a 
monolithic group by nationalist and religious 
extremists.  
Despite their precarious social position 
domestically, there are numerous international 
Islamic networks working for human rights, 
political representation and advocacy. 
Conversely, as Buddhist and Sinhalese 
nationalist groups maintain, there is an 
“absence of strong international allies for the 
Sinhalese” (Jones 2015:19) and they point to 
the prevalence of Muslim organisations 
globally. It is not the demographic realities in 
an imagined social group that sustain ethnic 
violence, but instead their connections to larger 
communities, whether real or imagined. 
The seeds of Islamic extremism, while 
not immediately obvious or important to the 
country’s security forces, had been festering 
for years, particularly in the Eastern part of the 
country (on the other side of the island from 
Colombo). The causal factors of Sri Lankan 
Jihadism were embedded in wider social 
complexities but were not sufficiently 
acknowledged or investigated by the state, by 
the security forces or by other ethno-religious 
groups. Muslim experiences of ‘otherness’ 
exist as an externally imposed set of identities, 
but also chosen self-identity. Their dress in 
Colombo for example, is now more visibly 
Arab influenced, particularly with women 
wearing hijabs and niqabs. This can easily feed 
into charges that Muslims have increased 
demographically in Colombo, purely because 
they are more visibly ‘Islamic’ rather than ‘Sri 
Lankan’ (Morrison 2019). A Buddhist monk 
explains, “20 years ago, Muslim women used 
saris, now only use black clothes. [Buddhist 
extremists] accuse them of creating a Middle 
Eastern environment.”   3
“The current trend toward Middle 
Eastern styles of dress and architecture now 
draws greater attention to the Muslims as a 
conspicuous social ‘other’ in the public sphere” 
( M c G i l v r a y 2 0 11 : 6 0 ) . T h e M u s l i m 
interviewees highlight how Sri Lankan Islam 
differs from Islam in Pakistan and Arab 
countries, but acknowledge the accusations that 
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk3
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Muslims seek to make Sri Lanka more like the 
Middle East, for example in the move away 
from traditional Lankan garments and spread 
of Arabic clothing.  The view of Muslim 
communities as insular has been asserted by 
Buddhist extremists and nationalists but may 
instead be “a polarising consequence of the 
conflict” (Secretariat for Muslims 2014:np), a 
phenomenon that is of course not confined to 
Sri Lanka’s Muslims.  
Islamic organisations in Sri Lanka have 
no history of agitating for secession or 
territorial autonomy, unlike the LTTE. 
However, Defence Secretary Gotabaya 
Rajapakse, the President’s brother, claimed in 
2013 that the country was vulnerable to 
Muslim extremism and that Islamic extremists 
had been discovered (Reuters 2013) but gave 
no evidence or details for this claim. In any 
case, there was little or no monitoring or 
surveillance of these groups or individuals. 
Pre-2019, the relative risk posed by Islamic 
extremists in the country was difficult to 
ascertain with any accuracy, given the paucity 
of concrete data, the abundance of accusations 
and the security apparatus’ focus on LTTE 
terrorism. 
Anderson’s (1983) concept of ‘imagined 
communities’ theorised the existence of 
socially constructed groups whose identity 
rests on their perceptions of being distinct from 
other social groups. The contested position of 
Islam in Sri Lanka is not only due to their self-
imposed isolation, but is also a product of their 
victimhood resulting from media, government 
and Buddhist nationalist propaganda. The 
binary dynamics of ethnic tensions between 
Sinhalese and Tamils “essentially diminished 
the chance for a common national identity to 
develop” (Imtiyaz & Stavis 2008:6) with the 
result that the country’s Muslims were further 
denied their sharing of a common national 
identity. For a small country, Sri Lanka has 
multiple nations within it. It is of course 
impossible to suggest that the Easter 2019 
atrocities would have occurred without these 
social factors; Jihadi terrorism has occurred in 
many other countries that lack these 
specificities. 
3.2. Interfaith activities 
Much of the primary data used in this paper 
emerged from interviews and focus group 
discussions with religious actors about the 
potential for faith-based initiatives to contest 
Buddhist nationalism and build a more 
peaceful Sri Lanka. To this end, scholars 
should examine religion’s functionality and 
social application to analyse its impact, rather 
than its claims or scriptural foundations 
(Johnson 2016). Religious contributions, and 
their impacts to peacebuilding have been 
neglected as areas of study (Smock 2006).  
Abu-Nimer (2011) emphasises the 
symbolic contributions of interreligious 
organisations and initiatives to peace, even if 
they lack tangible impacts, as they present a 
counter-narrative to faith as a source of 
division and conflict. Rigorous study of the 
peaceful impacts of religious involvement in 
conflict resolution has only recently started 
(Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana 2009), but 
in any case Sri Lanka’s numerous conflicts at 
micro and macro levels resist any simplistic 
categorisation as definitively either ethnic or 
religious conflicts. Smock (2006:35) notes how 
“how complications arise when religious 
divisions overlap with and reinforce ethnic or 
racial divisions” when attempting interfaith 
peacebuilding. Sri Lanka’s limited experience 
with peacebuilding activities over the years, 
and particularly its post-war reconciliation 
efforts, have not explicitly addressed the 
grievances of minorities (Aliff 2016) nor 
emphasised the contributions and influence of 
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religious actors, beyond a nationalist 
positioning of Sinhala Buddhism identity.  
Svensson (2007) finds that inter-religious 
conflicts are no more intractable than conflicts 
whose belligerents belong to the same faith. He 
thus suggests interfaith dialogue (IFD) should 
not be considered a priority in peacebuilding 
efforts. IFD tends to mobilise actors who are 
already broadly in agreement, rather than 
reaching extremists or those at risk of 
extremism (Bouta et al 2005). Interfaith 
programmes often lack the self-critical enquiry 
and reflection necessary to develop convincing 
theories of change to demonstrate their impacts 
(Neufeldt 2011). Faith actors enjoy legitimacy 
and leverage (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana 
2009), which are concepts referred to 
repeatedly by the interview respondents.  
Interfaith work directly combats ideals 
identified by Mousseau (2003:27) as inherent 
to terrorist actors: “a lack of empathy for out-
groups, an emphasis on community over the 
individual, and an incomprehension for 
objective truth and individual innocence”. A 
pluralistic interfaith approach that emphasises 
tolerance and humanistic values is in direct 
opposition to religious conservatives who 
perceive such an approach as a threat (Bouta et 
al 2005). 
Where Islamic extremism has been met 
with political repression and increased military 
activity, it has instead boosted popular support 
for extremist ideologies (Svensson 2007). 
Historically in Sri Lanka, Muslims and 
Buddhists enjoyed peaceful relations for 
centuries (Stewart 2014) with virtually no strife 
between them, unlike Sinhalese and Tamils 
(Ali 2013). The Catholic Church’s “identity as 
a colonial implant traditionally associated with 
pro-Western conservat ive pol i t ics i s 
central” (Johnson 2016:6).  
Does IFD suffer from excessively high 
expectations? In theory, IFD incorporates 
intercultural sensitivity and conflict resolution 
concepts (Abu-Nimer 2011). When IFD fails, it 
reinforces the perception that religion has only 
a weak influence on peace processes. However, 
when it succeeds, it is assimilated by more 
visible and elite level negotiations (Neufeldt 
2011). Either way, the overall impact of IFD 
for peace is uncertain, and suffers from 
political interference and machinations. 
Particularly where interfaith peacebuilding is 
linked with international interventions and 
humanitarian aid, the success record in Sri 
Lanka is very mixed (Cox et al 2014). Given 
the complexities of untangling interfaith 
peacebuilding from non-faith initiatives, more 
analytical breakdown and more evidence is 
required to demonstrate convincing theories of 
change and integrate political and economic 
elements in addition to the social cohesion 
aims of interfaith work. 
3.3. Terrorism incidence 
Democracies are under political pressure to 
take both preventative and responsive action of 
some kind against terrorist threats. However, 
they are severely constrained in the range of 
options they can take to combat terrorism 
(Enders & Sandler 2006) and the actions of 
their security forces (Lutz & Lutz 2007). 
Democracies often harbour politically excluded 
minorities whose politics and identities are 
overlooked in mainstream discourse (Eubank 
& Weinberg, 2001). Democracies have mass 
media that can unwittingly (or intentionally) 
assist in spreading propaganda (Enders & 
Sandler 2006) and hence assist in instilling fear 
in the public sphere. Jihadi terrorists wish to 
undermine the foundations of democracy not 
because they inherently hate democracy itself, 
bu t because they perce ive i t to be 
fundamentally unjust (Mousseau 2003). Jihadi 
terrorists target the international community for 
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its perceived support of corruption and 
autocracy; the ‘West’ and its proxies are 
therefore an easy enemy both to identify and to 
target (Kivimäki 2007). Sri Lanka’s Christians, 
much as Christians in the Middle East, find 
themselves identified as symbols of the global 
political order.  
The incidence of terrorism is predicted 
by levels of ethnic diversity, state repression 
and political structure (Piazza 2006). Islamic 
extremist violence occurs often when Muslims 
are a minority, but also in Muslim-majority 
countries where the extremists perceive 
themselves to be ‘a minority’. Given that 
“Islamic culture has not developed its own 
indigenous normative division between the 
secular and sacred spheres” (Johnson 1997:16) 
then this lack of distinction may complicate 
efforts to revolve this dilemma within Muslim 
communities. There has been considerable 
demonisation of Islam in Sri Lanka by the 
media and mainstream political discourse 
(Sarjoon et al 2016). Among other impacts, this 
hinders the internal tensions facing Muslims as 
they navigate between different competing 
visions of their own religion and leaves them 
without allies domestically.  
Atran’s and colleagues’ work on terrorist 
motivations and commitments are key here, 
particular the concept of the ‘devoted 
actor’ (Atran 2016): willing to protect 
important or ‘sacred values’ through sacrifice 
and extreme actions, even killing or dying, 
particularly when such values are integral to 
group identity. Sacred values are inviolable and 
are supported by actions beyond evident 
reason, disregarding calculable costs and 
consequences (Ginges et al, 2007). Actors 
motivated by ‘sacred values’ are seemingly 
invulnerable to external influence, compromise 
or negotiation. The behaviours of the Easter 
bombers indicate a willingness to die in pursuit 
of their aims, as observed in the vast majority 
of Jihadi-type mass atrocities. The ‘devoted 
actor’ argument challenges the role of 
grievance as a motivating factor in fomenting 
terrorist mass atrocities, and suggests that such 
actors are beyond the reach of any moderate 
religious doctrine or interfaith engagements. 
3.4. Post-war environments and 
peacebuilding 
Under President Rajapakse, the Sri Lankan 
state defeated the LTTE in 2009, after 26 years 
of civil war. Ethno-historical grievances, more 
than religious divisions, were a major factor in 
the causation of the war (Bouma, Ling & Pratt 
2010). However, the LTTE was a secular 
organisation (Patterson 2013) and maintained 
ethnicity, not religion, as the fundamental basis 
for social divisions. Although the war was not 
primarily a religious conflict, post-war tensions 
have increasingly shifted from ethnic to faith-
based (Svensson 2007). The ideology of a ‘just 
war’ is well elaborated in Islam and 
Christianity but also exists in Sri Lankan 
Buddhism, with the rationale that a certain 
level of violence is tolerable, permissible and 
even desirable to defend the faith (Frydenlund 
2005; Bartholomeusz 2002). The various 
legacies of the conflict include inter-group 
mistrust, competition for political space and 
contested conceptions of what comprises ‘the 
nation’. Furthermore, post-war reconciliation is 
a key aspect of preventing renewed conflict 
(Aliff 2016). Compared to countries such as 
Rwanda or South Africa, Sri Lanka’s 
reluctance to comprehensively address 
conflict-related ethnic minority sufferings can 
influence the dynamics of future iterations of 
armed violence. In addition to the obvious 
cleavages between Sinhalese and Tamils, the 
war years deepened divisions between Tamils 
and Muslims, mainly due to the LTTE 
expulsion of around 75,000 Muslims from the 
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Northern territories in 1990 and the killing of 
hundreds of unarmed Muslims while they were 
praying (Patterson 2013). The deprivations 
many Muslims experienced, primarily during 
the war, have contributed to the erosion of their 
empathy regarding the suffering of others 
(Haniffa 2015).  
Intergroup identity competition is a key 
causal factor in conflict genesis, rather than 
incompatible interests (Seul 1999) and the 
divisions between Buddhists and Muslims have 
likewise become more prominent in the post-
war environment. Berkwitz (2003:61) 
presciently observed that “if Muslims find 
themselves subjec t to extor t ion and 
intimidation by the LTTE, while being 
generally neglected by the Sinhala-dominated 
Government, they may turn to transnational 
Islamic groups for support and advocacy”. 
However, there is no evidence that the NTJ is 
anything more than an extremist fringe, and no 
indications that the organisation enjoyed any 
meaningful level of support from the Muslim 
community.  
Sri Lanka’s “culture of impunity… 
violence and the many war crimes have served 
to deepen the grievances held by all ethnic 
groups in the conflict” (Höglund & Orjuela 
2011:30). During and following the war, 
Buddhist monks were notorious for attacking 
peace demonstrations, opposition political 
party rallies, Tamil groups and other minorities 
(Gravers 2015). Orjuela notes, “In Sri Lanka, 
conflicts and violence at a local level are in 
many ways interlinked with the larger-scale 
violent conflict” (2003:204). The war years, 
characterised by the psychological construction 
of ‘the enemy’ rationalised and justified killing 
and torture by the LTTE and the government 
(Barnes 2013). This produced “categories of 
superior and inferior human beings” (Ibid 
p.353) which has affected all ethno-religious 
groups in the country. The war and its legacies 
have thus left multiple types of grievance to 
express. 
Many disparate peacebuilding activities 
in Sri Lanka during the war years were 
implemented top-down, in urban areas and in a 
fragmented manner (Orjuela 2003). They 
l a c k e d a c o h e s i v e a n d s u s t a i n e d 
implementation, tended not to reach rural 
areas, and were weak at targeting youth. 
Certain social groups featured more 
prominently than others in the post-war 
e n v i r o n m e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , “ t h e 
marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from 
the peace talks” (McGilvray & Raheem 
2007:48) was a major feature of the 
exclusionary post-war approach by adopted by 
the government. Post-war reconciliation 
discourse in Sri Lanka tends to only identify 
Sinhalese and Tamils as conflict actors (Aliff 
2015) and overlook Muslims and other 
minorities. “The government has embraced 
international peacebuilding frameworks” (Cox 
et al 2014:iv), but only to show adherence to 
global norms, without undertaking any of the 
economic, structural or cultural reforms 
necessary for post-war social change (Aliff 
2016). Since 2009, there have been virtually no 
top-down peacebuilding efforts, instead “a 
triumphalist, security-focused style of post-
conflict celebrations built on Sinhalese 
Buddhist ascendancy” (Morrison 2019:14) 
which downplays the suffering of other groups 
during the war years and denies their voice in 
contributing to a pluralistic and multi-identity 
society.  
4. Research methodology and data 
collection 
In June 2014, a series of deadly ethnic riots in 
Sri Lanka’s South West mostly targeted 
Muslims, their homes, properties and houses of 
worship. Following this, in August 2014 I 
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conducted 16 interviews with leaders and 
prominent activists of different faith 
organisations and two religiously-inspired 
NGOs engaged in peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation activities in Colombo and 
Galle. (It was too risky to attempt data 
collection in the actual areas affected by the 
riots). The interview respondents were 
representatives from Buddhism, Catholicism, 
Islam and Hinduism, and we also held a focus 
group discussion comprising 6 local faith 
leaders from Buddhism, Catholicism and 
Islam. The interviews were mostly in English, 
but a Sri Lankan field assistant translated from 
Sinhalese for some respondents. As the 
majority of faith groups in Sri Lanka are not 
overtly involved in post-war conflict 
transformation work, these interviewees tended 
to be more outspoken and less representative of 
the average religious leader. They comprise 
what Bouta et al (2005:13) label “the 
‘compassionate ones’, or ‘religious change 
agents’”. 
Full anonymity was given to each 
respondent, as several claimed to be at risk 
from extremists and the interview topics are 
highly politically charged. Names, ethnicities 
and organisations are not mentioned here, only 
religious affiliation. The interviews were open-
ended and semi-structured, lasting between 40 
and 90 minutes. Notes from each interview 
were shared afterwards with respondents to 
check accuracy. The prompting questions 
focussed on: 
- The roles and responsibilities of religious 
leaders and organisations for peacebuilding; 
- Relations with the Government, media and 
other faiths; 
- The influence and impact of Buddhist 
extremism and victimisation of Muslims; 
- Challenges and future developments for 
peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue. 
The most pertinent aspect of the data 
collection for this present paper is that it took 
place five years before the Easter 2019 
bombings. The data was originally collected to 
form the basis of a previous research paper 
(Morrison 2019), and therefore the data 
collection for this present paper comes with 
some caveats. The original purpose of these 
interviews was to gain insights into the ethno-
political environment in which the 2014 riots 
occurred and the contributions to peace of 
faith-based actors. However, the Easter 2019 
bombings were on a scale of violence much 
worse than any mass violence since the end of 
the war in 2009. The 2014 interview data thus 
took on a new and heightened importance 
especially as some of the data had not been 
analysed and included in the 2019 paper. 
To what extent can we draw parallels 
between Buddhist extremism and Islamic 
extremism, given that the death tolls are on 
such different scales? In light of the Easter 
2019 bombings, much of what the respondents 
had discussed took on new relevance, and 
deserved another examination with the benefit 
of hindsight. The interviews address many 
issues that are pertinent and relevant to the 
2019 attacks; the arguments and fears 
expressed by these religious leaders take on a 
heightened meaning and sense of urgency 
when viewed again in the context of the 2019 
Easter bombings, as they contain many 
prescient and provocative ideas and deserved 
a n o t h e r p r o c e s s o f a n a l y s i s a n d 
contextualisation. I decided to use the 
remaining interview data as a basis to examine 
the 2019 attacks within the narrower 
framework of interfaith peacebuilding 
activities rather than only the post-war context 
and rise of Buddhist extremism. Much of the 
primary data in this paper is quoted directly 
from the interviews and focus group 
discussions from 2014. 
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This paper relies more on insights from 
Catholic priests than from Buddhist monks, 
compared to the previous research paper. It 
must be remembered that during the 
interviews, the form of religious extremism 
that appeared to be the major post-war threat to 
peace in the country was Buddhist, rather than 
Islamic. What is more shocking in retrospect it 
how accurately the interviewees perceived the 
ethno-religious tensions and conflict potentials, 
and how their fears of further religious 
violence proved to be well founded.  
5. Results of the study 
5.1. Religious identities and extremism 
in Sri Lankan Society 
One of the principal claims emphasised by the 
interview respondents was that Sri Lanka’s 
conflict history helped create the conditions for 
the 2014 ethnic riots that primarily targetted 
Muslims, and which became infamous for the 
involvement of Buddhist monks. Since the end 
of the war in 2009, Muslims have replaced 
Tamils as the greatest perceived threat to 
national security and social stability. This is 
reflected in political discourse and public 
narratives, much of it in the national media 
(Sarjoon et al 2016). The state’s military 
victory to end the war sent an uncompromising 
message that blunt military force and 
aggressive rhetoric more effectively defeated 
the LTTE than negotiations, mediation or peace 
talks. This allowed the state to consolidate 
political power and strengthened its claims to 
be the sole protector of security and justice, 
with no requirement to acknowledge dissenters 
or the voices of minority groups. In this way, 
Sri Lanka’s state authorities view the end of the 
war through a narrow conflict lens (Bopage, 
2010), hindering possibilities for peacebuilding 
or meaningful interfaith dialogue.   
Religious identity has become more 
prominent in Sri Lankan society  and this has 4
engendered more interfaith activities, including 
among actors who traditionally avoided such 
initiatives. “It’s easy to approach people 
through faith…Faith is one of main ways to 
mobilise and inspire people in Lanka.”  A 5
Catholic Priest claims, “the civil war was won 
but the conflict was not resolved… There is 
still conflict between ethnicities and faiths. 
Buddhism is not the cause, but in each faith has 
extremists” . The ethnic majority feels like a 6
minority and the minority groups need to be 
more aware of this . “The silence of the 7
majority is more harmful than the violence of 
the few.”  8
“Lanka has a lot of local level 
goodwill… It needs to promote constitutional 
protections for minorities, and actually 
implement [them].  Currently there is a lack of 
will to implement the law, for example for 
Muslims, even minor offences are punished. 
Police prosecute Muslims more and worse.”  A 9
Senior Buddhist monk  describes how 10
“originally, in the Sinhalese vs. Tamil conflicts, 
Muslims were victims… Society is still infused 
with military thinking: violence is still part of 
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest4
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest5
 Interview 13, focus group discussion6
 Interview 15, Catholic Priest7
 Interview 13, Catholic Father8
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar9
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk10
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Lankan society… Government says they did 
reconciliation, but not really. Society still… 
holds impacts of the war”.  
During the war, any activities to promote 
peace were labelled pro-LTTE . The concept 11
of peace became associated in mainstream 
discourse with capitulation or compromise, or 
even with weakness in the face of the LTTE 
threat. Much of this narrative was led by 
nationalistic Buddhist monks, and there is a 
shortage of Buddhist monks able and willing to 
stand up for peace, or even who understand the 
concept of human rights . This leads to a lack 12
of mainstream criticism against extremist 
narratives, including from within the Sangha . 13
One faith NGO worker laments, “The main 
Lankan ethnic groups are divided and separate, 
socially and geographically with no chance to 
live/work together…. Local level people know 
the problems, but leaders and politicians don’t 
know…. [we] need to work more with Muslim 
organisations.”   14
Government policy was fixated on the 
LTTE as a security threat, and Islam as a 
cultural and social threat. “The government’s 
argument for this is the need for constant 
vigilance… to protect national security... create 
a ‘threat’ in the minds of the people.”  One 15
Catholic Father is openly critical: “The 
government benefits from interfaith strife to 
stay in power… We need a strong people’s 
movement to promote pluralism, faith harmony 
and social justice. Politicians don’t want peace 
in Sri Lanka” . Local politicians are often 16
supportive of IFD and peacebuilding efforts. 
Local level and sub-national initiatives such as 
Inter Faith Dialogue Centre operate with no 
external funding and no central Gov support, 
yet report very good impact. However, national 
level politicians create divisions and benefit 
from divided communities, and there is a 
shortage of communal harmony initiatives 
from the top. Politicians interfere and disrupt 
peacebuilding act ivi t ies . “[For] big 17
politicians… religion is nothing, just a front. 
They don’t believe even though the people 
do… Interfaith conflict is exploited by 
politicians. As long as this happens, we cannot 
have proper interfaith dialogue.”  18
Some respondents draw linkages 
between the government, and the media in 
facilitating and even encouraging interethnic 
tensions for political gains. A Hindu preacher 
explains, “Currently there are interfaith 
tensions. Soon after war’s end, people felt ‘we 
are sick of war and don’t want another one’. So 
people prefer peace... But now again this is 
changing. The media creates intercommunal 
hatred, and different faith leaders are racist, 
inc lud ing Mus l ims… People s t a r t ed 
questioning what is happening now, and asking 
faith leaders… [and] asking questions about 
the Government: Are we moving towards 
conflict again? People are afraid.”  19
 “Religion is politicised and political 
powers use religion to create divisions. A 
 Interview 13, focus group discussion11
 Interview 16, Catholic Priest12
 The monastic community of ordained Buddhist monks, and nuns in some countries13
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk14
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk15
 Interview 16, Catholic Priest16
 Interview 16, Catholic Priest17
 Interview 15, Catholic Priest18
 Interview 11, Hindu Priest19
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broken country is easier to rule… Under our 
noses, the trust between communities is 
broken. The media doesn’t show the full 
story.”  Claims a Muslim scholar, “the media 20
is also involved in poisoning people’s 
minds”.   21
 As another minority group in Sri Lanka, 
Christians are more able to identify with 
Muslim concerns and perceptions . One 22
Catholic Father explains how he prioritises 
meeting Muslims, to encourage them to be 
more inclusive, for example to stop 
“demanding schools only for Muslims”, but it 
is not easy . He concludes, “We cannot let 23
Muslims get isolated… [we] need to maintain 
connection with Buddhists, but also with 
Muslims.” . 24
 With hindsight, it is shocking to see the 
refusals of some Sri Lankan Muslims in 2014 
to acknowledge the potential for extremist 
violence being perpetrated by their co-
religionists. For example, one Muslim 
respondent  claims that the allegation was 25
false that “Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba  had set 26
up a centre in Lanka”. He is worth quoting in 
full: 
On 27 June 2009, the US Embassy in 
Colombo sent a report to the State 
Department, leaked by WikiLeaks 
[concerning Lashkar-e-Taiba]. USA 
also did not share this report with the 
Lankan Government... but it was shared 
with India [which] in turn followed up 
through its own intelligence apparatus, 
and shared with the Indian media, that 
Lashkar-e-Taiba operates in Lanka. 
India too kept it a secret instead of 
sharing with the Lankan Government… 
the story of extremist groups in Lanka 
was published in Indian media. [There 
are] many such allegations…  I know 
this to be false though.  
5.2. Impacts of interfaith work 
Domestic interfaith work historically overlaps 
with interethnic peace work, and has mostly 
involved linking people from the North, 
particularly Tamils, with Sinhalese from the 
South and East. This approach reflected the 
war-era divisions between Tamil-majority areas 
and the rest of the island, and now appears 
outdated; it does not accurately reflect the main 
inter-group tensions that now exist. An Islamic 
scholar  acknowledges “generally, Lankan 27
Buddhist community is very tolerant, on a 
global scale… there are years of goodwill 
between minorities and Sinhalese… we need 
dialogue, and not to respond to extremist 
provocation, which will only make the problem 
worse.”  
Faith leaders tend to assume that all faith 
communities respect them, regardless what 
 Interview 13, focus group discussion20
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar21
 Interview 14, Catholic Priest22
 Interview 14, Catholic Priest23
 Interview 14, Catholic Priest24
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar25
 A significant Islamist terrorist organization, active across South Asia. It was founded in 1987 and 26
is headquartered in Pakistan.
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar27
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religion they are affiliated with . They 28
“command respect among people, regardless of 
the actual faith” . This influence brings with it 29
responsibility: a Muslim preacher questions,  30
“as faith leaders we have responsibility to 
ensure peace, otherwise people afterwards will 
ask, why didn’t you stop conflict? Why not 
promote peace?” 
Pre-2009, Muslims were also victims of 
LTTE aggression, most notably the 1990 LTTE 
cleansing of Muslims in the Northern Province. 
Muslim respondents were generally more 
pessimistic about the possibilities for a 
peaceful Sri Lanka, an attitude which stems 
from the 2014 riots and Muslim victimisation 
more generally. Several Islamic umbrella 
organisations have emerged in recent years, to 
promote Muslims’ rights and representation, 
and as a response to Buddhist extremism and 
prejudice . Such organisations advise self-31
preservation and safety over pressuring the 
government or political agitation. There is little 
demonstrable influence on these Sri Lankan 
organisations from the Middle East, and they 
are much more a domestic phenomenon. For 
example, The National Shoora Council (NSC) 
was formed in 2012 as a response to 
continuous attacks and criticisms of Muslims 
and Islam. An Islamic cleric draws linkages 
between the war termination, and the 
victimisation of Muslims: “Such criticisms 
emerged suddenly, and weren’t there before the 
end of the war… Sri Lanka was safe from such 
influence of accusations against Islam and 
Muslims, until after the end of the war.”  32
Domestic fears of ‘Islamification’ and Islamic 
ideologies are influenced by global events. 
Buddhists point to ethnic cleansing of 
Christians in the Middle East,  anti-Buddhist 33
violence in countries such as Bangladesh or the 
demographic changes in Indonesia and 
Afghanistan following Muslim invasions (Aliff 
2015) to show a possible scenario of Sinhalese 
becoming a minority in their own homeland if 
the demographic growth of Muslims is not 
contained.  
Sri Lanka lacks of a culture of open and 
unpartisan discussion, claims a Buddhist 
monk . If someone puts forward a strong 34
opinion, there is a tendency for people to 
believe he has a political agenda or is paid by 
some organisation. Interviewees indicate that it 
is challenging to promote the concept of 
mutual benefit or universal ideals, beyond and 
across disparate social groups. According to 
Muslim respondents, their own congregations 
are even more suspicious . “IFD [is] 35
sometimes met with suspicion- [people] 
thinking it’s foreign agenda, politically 
sensitive.”     36
The strongest interfaith effects are seen 
when faith actors do not distinguish the faith of 
beneficiary groups . IFD starts by first 37
respecting the dignity and humanity of ‘the 
 Interview 11, Hindu Priest28
 Interview 10, Hindu Priest29
 Interview 13, focus group discussion30
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar31
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar32
 Interview 15, Catholic Priest33
 Interview 3, Buddhist monk34
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar, 35
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk36
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest37
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other’ and demonstrating that respect to them . 38
Respondents mention the need to get their own 
congregations on board before they engage 
with others. “Need to educate one’s own 
people first and sensitise them before 
approaching others” .  One Islamic scholar 39
claims , “we would actually support the 40
development of Buddhism in Lanka, as most 
people in Lanka are not really very religious”. 
“The impact [of IFD] is hard to measure. 
People are frightened nowadays… Extremist 
groups are looking for people who come 
together [peacefully]” . “[IFD] has to be 41
sensitive about visibility. People are scared to 
come together, scared of being identified, 
facing consequences [from extremists]. [We] 
must bring trust, to reduce fear. But if 
extremists continue… people will be afraid.”  42
A Hindu priest admits to being “pessimistic 
about peace between communities in near 
future. The trend is that there will be less 
peace.”  43
The Sri Lankan people live with 
significant levels of fear . “We are a 44
militarised country. We see tanks and army 
everywhere, but we don’t realise it.”  “Their 45
presence helps control population. Don’t need 
guns: uniform and presence is enough to send a 
message... This started after 2009.”  Police 46
have ignored attacks on Muslim homes and 
shops . After the civil war, there was some 47
level of goodwill within society, but that has 
now evaporated  . “Politics needs to change. 48
People are in fear. The root causes of conflict 
need to be addressed, politically…. People 
need to be free… free to oppose the ruling 
party.”   49
5.3. Limitations of interfaith activities 
Interfaith work suffers from a variety of 
programmatic and ideological weaknesses. 
Faith groups tend to have weak management 
mechanisms, with limited monitoring, 
evaluation or impact assessments of their work, 
and an uncritical assumption that their 
activities are beneficial (Bouta et al 2005). 
Faith leaders tend to be urban, more educated 
and male dominated, despite the significant 
differences between urban and rural 
populations. Addressing poverty should be 
fundamental to interfaith peacebuilding work . 50
Poverty is an issue that cannot be addressed 
separately from conflict and which is more of 
an immediate priority for local people . The 51
interview respondents all broadly agree that Sri 
Lanka’s four major faiths have the same 
fundamental ideals of peace and conflict 
 Interview 7, Buddhist monk38
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar39
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resolution, and that the current conflicts are not 
ideological or doctrinal. These faith leaders 
consider a small number of extremists from 
different religions to be responsible for mass 
violence, not whole communities. 
Fundamentally, one major challenge they 
face is that interfaith work is not well known in 
Sri Lanka. Generally, there is tolerance (or 
ignorance) of other faiths, and people live in 
separate and distinct communities rather than 
mixing. “Local people mix, if they are called 
together [for IFD], but otherwise will generally 
be separate. They don’t mind being together, 
but on their own, they wouldn’t intermingle.”  52
Engagement in interfaith work faces the 
difficulty that: “people expect to get material 
benefits [from it], it takes time to realise the 
‘soft’ advantages”.  Faith leaders engage in 53
interfaith and peacebuilding work and meet 
with each other, but this pattern is not 
replicated with their congregations . The faith 54
leaders claim success in diffusing violence and 
hatred: “Only calling the leaders, doesn’t reach 
the people.  They don’t pass information or 
messages onto the people, [they] keep it to 
themselves. So [my organisation] prioritises 
local people’s activities.”  Several respondents 55
refer to the disconnect between what religions 
preach, and what they actually deliver or how 
they act, and there is mistrust between faith 
leaders : “We are too ceremonial, not practical 56
enough.”   57
Within some faiths, individuals who 
work for IFD and peacebuilding are threatened 
by their own community . But the concept and 58
practice of IFD is fairly new in Sri Lanka, and 
people think co-existence is just faith leaders 
sitting together  without perceiving the wider 59
picture: “people have to internalise what co-
existence really means. As faith leaders, we 
didn’t tell people in the past the importance of 
co-existence” . Another Catholic Father says, 60
“We ask people to join us to work for [social] 
transformation. But priests live comfortably, 
[we] use luxury vehicle etc.  These priests are 
not ready to transform others” . Furthermore, 61
“the government [labels] the church people as 
LTTE if they work for social justice...They are 
trying to change the government who think 
they are against them. The Church is not ready 
for this struggle” .  62
Faith leaders’ activities can be as modest 
as going to each other’s houses of worship, 
joint visits to conflict affected areas, 
celebrating each other’s festivals and eating 
together. Post-violent incidents, local people 
appreciate having visits from faith leaders of 
different faiths . Immediate post-riot actions, 63
like joint religious visits, generally have strong 
positive impacts and faith leaders are often 
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest52
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| 117http://dx.doi.org/10.30827/revpaz.v13i1. 13901 ISSN 1988-7221 | Vol.13 | Nº 1 | 2020 | pp. 99-124
able to visit locations where violence has 
erupted . Faith leaders appear to support the 64
need for some degree of censorship. The 
mixed-faith focus group stated that a full report 
on the 2014 riots could lead to reprisal attacks 
and increase violence . Multi-faith peace work 65
has been threatened: “People are frightened 
nowadays in interfaith dialogue. Extremist 
groups are looking for people who come 
together.”  A senior monk explains, “they 66
realised that faith leaders don’t trust each other. 
The objective is to remove suspicion… faith 
actors have legitimacy, can attract people… 
[but we were] branded as LTTE supporters, 
when working for peace during war” .  67
Compared to Churches, which are often 
well-established and present across the island, 
mosques are less well-established and more 
localised. In general, Christians have more 
international backing and institutional 
connections than Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
Christians tend to feel more secure and 
‘embedded’ as an integral part of Sri Lankan 
society, in part due to a position of authority 
and influence that remains from colonial times 
and their better levels of English. In contrast, 
Muslim respondents report that Muslims have 
a tendency to engage less in inter-communal 
relations . For example, the Inter Religious 68
Peace Foundation was formed by Buddhists 
and Christians, with no participation from 
Muslims. 
There is significant interfaith activity 
happening, particularly led by Catholics, but 
there is less involvement of Hindus and 
Muslims in interfaith peacebuilding. The 
respondents acknowledge that the importance 
of IFD and outreach has often been overlooked 
by Muslims , and its practice is generally new 69
and unfamiliar to Sri Lankan Muslims , but 70
following the end of the war, there was a 
significant increase in Muslim engagement in 
IFD. Some people do not want their leaders 
undertaking IFD, particularly Muslims . “As a 71
Muslim leader, some people in my community 
don’t want me to work with other faiths” . 72
Despite Sri Lanka’s small surface area, some 
areas are culturally isolated, such as the town 
of Sainthamaruthu, whose demographics are 
100% Muslim. Sainthamaruthu is not reached 
by interfaith efforts. “[An Islamic organisation] 
is still weak at IFD, similar to the Muslim 
community as a whole. They realise its 
importance but it needs to be made more 
intense… The current dialogue between 
religions is inadequate and needs to be made 
stronger.”  73
A Catholic Father observes, “After [2014 
riots], Muslims fear joining other minority 
groups… but they are moving towards 
solidarity… Muslims generally do not want to 
share other faiths’ rituals, but there are 
exceptions… there are some working for 
interfaith and peace…. in Anuradhapura, 
 Interview 13, Focus group discussion64
 Interview 13, Focus group discussion65
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest66
 Interview 7, Buddhist monk67
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar68
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar69
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar70
 Interview 11, Hindu Priest71
 Interview 13, focus group discussion 72
 Interview 9, Muslim scholar73
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Muslims [were] singing carols… in a Buddhist 
temple. But these are isolated cases” . He 74
continues, “We celebrate workers’ Mass, on 
May Day. Even Hindus, Buddhists etc. Nobody 
feels alienated, use all languages, all sacred 
texts [sic], lyrics composed by non-Christians. 
But Muslims will not accept such a thing... We 
cannot even invite them. It’s open to them, but 
they will not accept, because it’s against 
Islamic teachings.  But for other faiths- no 
problem, [they are] happy with the idea”. A 
Senior Catholic Sister explains, “[we] met 
weekly for IFD… with main nine churches and 
other groups associated with Christian faith… 
[also] Buddhist and Hindu. Not so much with 
Muslims.”  75
Despite religious leaders’ claims to be 
socially important, they admit that interfaith 
initiatives are not enough to combat 
propaganda, media and tolerance of anti-
minority violence. Pro-peace individuals often 
have to keep a low profile.  “The Government 76
spent a lot on war, but spent little on peace…. 
No recognition of reconciliation needs, 
people’s grievances.”  “The government 77
[should] prevent further conflict… together 
with NGOs and civil society [and] faith 
actors… [in the] South African example, the 
government was involved in reconciliation, and 
was successful.”  78
Government policy discourages NGO 
activities such as peacebuilding, and new laws 
and restrictions against NGOs were introduced, 
although this has relaxed in recent years. “[the 
government] doesn’t support in this way. No 
overt barriers, but the Government should be 
more involved. [Peace] should be a primary 
goal of the Government.”  79
6. Conclusion 
Interfaith dialogue (IFD) is desirable for post-
war social relations to repair structural 
divisions and allow for improved inter-group 
communications. But IFD does not engage 
extremists. The National Thowheeth Jama'ath 
(NTJ) or any extremist group could have 
carried out the Easter 2019 bombings even in 
the absence of any interfaith work. This 
highlights the need for robust security 
apparatus, inter-agency communications, and 
surveillance to be implemented parallel to 
local level peacebuilding and community 
cohesion efforts. There are demonstrable 
shortcomings in the Sri Lankan security 
apparatus and political infighting that hinder 
coherent and organised anti-terrorism policy. 
Interfaith dialogue, even if competently 
undertaken and supported by the government, 
demonstrates limited impact in contesting the 
ideologies of armed, organised and committed 
‘devoted actor’ extremists. The interview 
respondents highlight the reluctance and social 
barriers limiting the involvement of Sri Lankan 
Muslims in interfaith activities. Although this 
phenomenon is changing, a lack of engagement 
with other faiths is both a product, and a cause, 
of the disenfranchised position and alienation 
of the country’s Muslim minority. Particularly 
in post-war contexts, interfaith activities should 
be integrated with other elements of 
peacebuilding and social cohesion efforts.  
 Interview 15, Catholic Priest74
 Interview 8, Catholic Sister75
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest76
 Interview 5, Buddhist monk77
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest78
 Interview 6, Catholic Priest79
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Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka has 
emerged as a country experiencing a surfeit of 
victimhoods; highly contested, oppositional, 
and presented as zero-sum. Different ethno-
religious groups have grievances to express, 
and perceive a lack of willing listeners. The 
concept of fear emerges repeatedly from the 
interview data and is repeatedly mentioned as a 
major aspect of modern Sri Lankan society. 
Different social groups are afraid, of the 
pe rce ived ‘o the r ’ , o f domes t i c and 
international threats, of a return to open 
c o n f l i c t , o f b e i n g o v e r w h e l m e d 
demographically. The last decade has seen 
multiple post-war social developments, many 
of them a desirable move forward and positive 
for a country riven by ethno-religious hatreds 
and violence. The legacies of the civil war are 
various, and experienced by different groups in 
different ways: more limited social identity 
formulations, political parties with narrower 
mandates and nationalist ideologies that deny 
minorities an equitable place in a plural 
society. Under President Rajapakse, the 
government succeeded in terminating the war, 
a v ic to ry tha t e luded any p rev ious 
administration for 26 years, but cemented into 
public discourse the idea that the LTTE, and by 
extension Tamils, were a group that could not 
be negotiated with, only destroyed (Barnes 
2013). The interview respondents emphasise 
how this zero-sum thinking has persisted and 
become normalised; not only for the 
government but for non-state actors as well. 
I t is fascinating to uncover the 
similarities between Jihadis and Buddhist 
extremists. Beyond the discrepancies in the 
scale of their violence, they share perceptions 
of a global order that victimises them: the 
machinations of a world system that 
undermines their claims to nationhood and 
rightful belonging. Parallel to this is their 
shared perception of being unfairly treated; 
denied their rightful position in their own 
country. One framework to examine the Easter 
bombings is through how global dynamics and 
disputes are interpreted and actualised at local 
level. Sri Lanka’s Muslims suffered terribly 
during the war years particularly through LTTE 
expulsions and attacks, and following the war, 
at the hands of Buddhist extremists and mob 
violence. However, Christianity’s position as a 
proxy for global patterns of dominance and 
subjugation, even while these are not evident in 
Sri Lanka, still positioned the faith and its 
adherents as the main targets of Islamic Jihad. 
NTJ could strike a blow against Christians in 
Sri Lanka as symbols of global hegemonic 
inequalities, connected ineffably to worldwide 
power structures, instead of targeting Tamil 
Hindus or Sinhalese Buddhists as revenge for 
war-era sufferings. Hardline Buddhist groups 
in Sri Lanka, and Islamic extremists globally, 
claim a Westernised, global order that isolates 
and punishes those ideologies and peoples that 
do not follow mainstream systems and 
conventions. Both groups repeatedly refer to 
global bias against them. A further similarity is 
their shared persecution of the country’s 
Christian minority, although Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims are not targetted by the Christians. 
Despite the targeting of international 
hotels, most of the dead were Sri Lankans (215 
out of 259). Sri Lanka’s bombings thus link the 
international events and domestic tensions, but 
the local conditions do not in themselves 
constitute a necessary cause of mass atrocity. 
The 2019 bombings could have occurred even 
in the absence of civil war, anti-Muslim riots or 
ethno-political victimisation. As events have 
demonstrated in recent decades, Jihadi 
grievances are transnational and based on 
imagined ‘sacred values’ that outsiders find 
difficult to conceptualise, anticipate or respond 
to. 
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However the Easter bombings are 
contextualised, there are limited causal 
elements in Sri Lanka’s existing ethno-
religious strife to explain it. The 2019 
massacres were not merely a reaction to 
Buddhist aggression, nor to anti-Muslim 
violence, nor to perceived Christ ian 
dominance, nor as a response to the 
Christchurch massacre, nor to LTTE 
aggressions during the war. Sri Lanka was 
identified by Jihadis as a soft target with 
inefficient security procedures, where an attack 
on Christians and international targets would 
be an attack on the global power structure. It 
was not merely a continuation of domestic 
ethnic violence and must be understood within 
the context of global movements and events, 
many of which make Muslims feel alienated 
and powerless. Their contested social position 
in Sri Lanka has many similarities with their 
social position globally. Deeper examinations 
of Sri Lanka’s conflict dynamics may be a 
necessary aspect of uncovering how and why 
Islamic extremists were able to commit such a 
horrendous atrocity, but these are not in 
themselves sufficient causes. 
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